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I.

INTRODUCTION

When a law enforcement officer arrests an injured or visibly sick
person, the officer typically transports the arrestee directly to a hospital
for treatment prior to formal booking in a jail or detention facility.'
Indeed, convicted inmates, pretrial detainees, and arrestees have a
constitutional right to receive necessary medical care while in police
custody. 2 However, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished
a government's constitutional obligation to provide necessary medical

t. The author extends many thanks to her faculty advisor, Professor Zack Buck, for his
guidance and insight throughout the research and writing processes. She also wishes to
express her gratitude to her family and Lawson Bittick for their invaluable support and
encouragement during this project.
1. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc. v. City of Macon, 326 Ga.
App. 603, 757 S.E.2d 207 (2014) (No. A13A1928), 2013 WL 5669733, at *4-5.
2. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
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care from a duty to pay for such care.' Instead, the Supreme Court has
held that a governmental entity must pay for medical treatment of a
person in its custody only if the person cannot receive treatment without
payment.4 Thus, while a government entity must ensure an injured
person in its custody receives care, the government may lawfully defer
the costs of such care if alternate sources of funding are available.'
States therefore have substantial discretion in determining precisely how
to uphold this constitutional responsibility in practice.
In Georgia, the state legislature enacted section 42-5-2 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),' which allocates how state and
local governments will pay for the medical expenses of "inmates."' The
statute, however, does not define "inmate," leaving open the question of
whether the statute applies to arrestees in law enforcement custody who
require medical attention prior to a formal booking in a detention
facility.
To further complicate matters, because the Georgia Code elsewhere
defines "inmate" in terms of a person's confinement in a detention
facility,' arresting law enforcement agencies that do not operate their
own jails-most often, municipal police departments-enjoy a statutory
loophole that allows them to legally deny financial responsibility for
arrestee medical care prior to a formal jail booking. This statutory
ambiguity has sparked protracted litigation among Georgia's cities,
counties, and hospitals about who pays for inmate care before formal
booking."o Unfortunately, such litigation has led to neither binding
precedent on the substantive issue from the state appellate courts nor
legislative action to clarify the statutory provision." Consequently,

3.
4.

Id. at 245.
Id.

5. See id.
6. Id.
7. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 (2014).
8. Id.
9. O.C.G.A. § 42-4-30(2) (2014) (defining "inmate" as "a person who is detained in a
detention facility by reason of being charged with or convicted of a felony, a misdemeanor,
or a municipal offense").
10. See, e.g., City of Hapeville v. Grady Meml Hosp. Corp., 328 Ga. App. 332, 761
S.E.2d 871 (2014); Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga. v. City of Macon, 326 Ga. App. 603, 757 S.E.2d
207 (2014) (wherein litigation between the city and hospital lasted nine years, beginning
in 2005 and reaching final disposition in the city's favor in 2014).
11. See City ofHapeville, 328 Ga. App. at 337, 761 S.E.2d at 874-75 (see Judge Dillard's
concurrence in judgment only, noting that the opinion may not be cited as binding
precedent); Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., 326 Ga. App. at 606-07, 757 S.E.2d at 209-10 (court
declined to rule on issue of who is responsible for payment under statute based on
hospital's failure to adequately preserve issue on appeal).
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lingering uncertainty surrounding this and other related legal questions
emboldens municipal law enforcement agencies to shirk their responsibilities to pay for indigent arrestees' medical care. While the statute
aims to ensure that all persons in government custody have access to
medical care and streamline the means of providing such care, the
uncompensated hospitals are victims of the statute's shortcomings.
Indeed, because the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) 1 2 requires hospitals that accept federal Medicare
funding to treat injured persons presented to its emergency rooms
regardless of the patients' ability to pay for the services rendered,
hospitals suffer financially-not only from the lack of reimbursement,
but also from the expense of often protracted litigation sparked by an
unclear area of law. This Comment explores the legal history of
providing and paying for medical care of persons in custody of Georgia's
law enforcement agencies and the practical implications of failing to
allocate a clear duty to pay for indigent arrestee medical care.
Ultimately, this Comment does not propose a radical, cure-all
alternative to Georgia's current "non-approach" to allocating financial
responsibility for arrestee medical care before booking or municipal
inmate medical care. Rather, it merely attempts to elucidate a muddled
and often overlooked area of law where Georgia's systems of healthcare
and policing directly converge. That is not to say, however, that the
current state of the law is sustainable or desirable; quite the contrary.
As the statutory and judicial construction of the law surrounding inmate
medical care presently stands, often fact specific, legal formalism gives
virtually unlimited discretion to self-interested parties: both the
hospitals and state and local law enforcement agencies. That is, the
current state of the law emboldens law enforcement to hide handcuffs
from the hospital, deny custody, and avoid financial responsibility.
Conversely, though hospitals cannot lawfully turn patients away, the
law also incentivizes emergency room employees to stabilize and release
indigent arrestees as quickly as possible-perhaps through a back door,
unbeknownst to the officer-in the interest of minimizing their expenses.
By refusing to state clearly and concisely who pays for arrestee
medical care before booking, the Georgia legislature has afforded-and
Georgia Courts have sanctioned-immense discretion to hospitals and
law enforcement agencies to alter facts in their favor and manipulate
legal loopholes to their benefit. The unsettled nature of this area of law,
coupled with significant discretion afforded to self-interested parties,
ultimately harms the public interest. While indigent, accused criminals

12.
13.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
Id.
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are not necessarily a sympathetic class when it comes to convincing
politicians and courts to fund their care, the present alternative-of
unfunded uncertainty that makes predictive financial planning by all
parties a near impossibility-harms patients, taxpayers, government
entities, and hospitals alike. Indeed, it is time for the law-either the
state legislature or judiciary-to pick a payor: to clarify who should pay
for arrestee and municipal inmate medical care and save the public from
the current vacuum of unlimited, unpredictable discretion among the
involved parties.
This Comment begins by mapping the legal history of providing and
paying for the medical care of persons in custody of law enforcement.
This piece explores the Supreme Court's recognition of an incarcerated
person's constitutional right to receive adequate medical care, as well as
the Court's interpretation of how that constitutional right can impose-or fail to impose-financial responsibility for inmate and detainee
medical care. The focus then narrows to Georgia's statutory scheme for
allocating a duty to pay for inmate medical care: specifically, ambiguities
in the statutory language about when and to whom the duty applies and
interpretations of the language by Georgia courts. Two Georgia Court of
Appeals opinions provide particularly rich case studies, illustrating the
uncertainty and protracted litigation bred by the current statutory
scheme and the interpretive gaps therein. Next, this Comment examines
how EMTALA interacts with Georgia law to the detriment of hospitals,
followed by a comparative analysis of a neighboring jurisdiction's
alternative approach to payment for indigent arrestees' medical care.
Finally, this Comment ruminates upon the practical implications of
Georgia's uncertain system for allocating financial responsibility for
indigent arrestee and municipal inmate medical care.
II.

LEGAL HISTORY

While the United States Supreme Court has held that states may not
expressly restrict access to medical care," a state is only responsible for
providing medical care to an individual where it has significantly
infringed upon that individual's liberty." Incarcerated persons' rights
to adequate medical care derive from the Eighth Amendmentl6 prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth" and Fourteenth Amendments." In Estelle v. Gamble,"

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the Supreme Court held that refusing to provide necessary medical care
for convicted inmates is incompatible with contemporary standards of
decency, and causes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.20 The Court reasoned that, because
inmates have been deprived of their liberty and cannot seek care for
themselves, it is fair to require the government to provide care.2 1 As
explained below, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment only protects a person following a conviction.22
The rights of pretrial detainees and arrestees arise instead from the due
process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.23
However, before City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital,24 the
Court considered a state's duty to provide medical care only in terms of
receipt and adequacy of the care.' That is, until City of Revere, the
Court had not contemplated whether the Constitution requires the state
to pay the treating hospital for the care provided.
A

A Substantive Due Process Right to Receive Medical Care

City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital" presented the
Supreme Court with its first opportunity to consider whether a state or
municipality has a constitutional duty to pay for medical treatment
received by an individual in police custody.2 7 In this seminal case, the
Supreme Court held that injured arrestees, like pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners, have a substantive due process right to receive
necessary medical care. However, the Court held that the duty to
provide medical care includes no corresponding duty to pay.2 9 Indeed,
the Court rejected that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel

19. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
20. Id. at 104-05.
21. Id. at 103-04.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
24. 463 U.S. 239 (1983).
25. Id. at 244; see, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that an
institutionalized person has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to conditions of reasonable care and safety, freedom from bodily
restraints, and training or "habilitation"); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (holding that
deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, regardless of whether the indifference was
manifested by prison doctor's responding to a prisoner's medical needs or by guards
intentionally denying access to medical care or interfering with treatment once prescribed).
26. 463 U.S. 239 (1983).
27. Id. at 240.
28. Id. at 244.
29. Id. at 245.
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and unusual punishment attaches a duty to governmental entities to pay
for the medical care of indigent arrestees in custody in order to ensure
the receipt of medical care." Rather, the Court held that Eighth
Amendment rights and duties are not implicated prior to conviction.3
In City of Revere, city police responded to a call about a breaking and
entering in progress. On the scene, police pursued a suspect, Patrick
Kivlin, who was attempting to flee. After repeated commands to stop and
after a warning shot failed to deter the suspect from fleeing, an officer
shot Kivlin. Officers called a private ambulance to transport him to the
hospital, and one officer accompanied him in the ambulance. The
wounded suspect spent nine days in the hospital, during which police
issued a warrant for his arrest. Three days after the arrest warrant was
issued, the hospital discharged Kivlin into police custody. A judge later
released Kivlin from custody on personal recognizance. Twenty days
after Kivlin's release, the treating hospital billed the Chief of Police
$7948.50 for its services. One month later, Kivlin returned to the
hospital for additional treatment, which resulted in a second bill totaling
$5360.41. The hospital again billed the City for Kivlin's care. The City
denied financial responsibility for either bill, and the hospital sued the
City to recover for medical services rendered to the suspect.32
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, the City was liable to the hospital for the medical
services rendered to the suspect.3 The state supreme court reasoned
that the City's liability for payment was necessary "[tlo ensure Kivlin's
right to medical care."' The Supreme Court, however, rejected the
state supreme court's argument that Eighth Amendment protection was
necessary to ensure that persons in police custody receive necessary
medical attention." Rather, the Court held that the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment only
protects a person after the state has secured a formal adjudication of his
guilt. 6 The Court thus rejected the application of an Eighth Amend-

ment analysis to necessary medical treatment for injuries to a person
shot by a police officer and arrested.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 240, 241.
Id. at 241.
Mass. Gen. Hosp. v. Revere, 434 N.E.2d 185, 189 (Mass. 1982).
City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244.
Id.
Id.
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Instead, the Court held that the only source of constitutional
protection for injured arrestees and pretrial detainees in need of medical
care is the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, in which the
court found the constitutional right to receive necessary medical
treatment.3 8 However, the Court declined either to impose a duty on
states or municipalities to pay for this medical treatment or to delineate
guidelines or procedures for determining who is financially responsible.3 ' Rather, the Court left those decisions to the states, holding that
"how the city .

.

. obtains such treatment is not a federal constitutional

question."4 0
In a troubling explanation of its decision not to mandate government
reimbursement of hospitals that treat injured persons in police custody,
the Court relied on the legal responsibility of hospitals to provide care
despite the likelihood or certainty of receiving payment for that care.4 1
The Court explained that, if the governmental entity can obtain medical
care for the person in custody only by paying for it, then it must pay;
however, the Court noted that "[t]here are ... other means by which the
entity could meet its obligation. Many hospitals are subject to federal or
state laws that require them to provide care to indigents."42 In declining to dictate who pays for the inmate's medical care, the Court
explicitly endorsed a trend of minimizing the financial responsibilities
of law enforcement agencies at the expense of hospitals. Still, Georgia,
like most other states, has adopted a statutory scheme imposing a duty
to provide medical care and delineating a mechanism for determining
who pays.
B.

A ContractualDuty to Pay

Perhaps the most obvious source of payment is the arrestee, detainee,
or prisoner himself. Under basic contract principles, a hospital that
provides a prisoner or arrestee with medical care is entitled to payment
from him. For example, if an arrestee requests medical care, the hospital
is entitled to payment from the beneficiary for its services under the
contract. If, on the other hand, the arrestee does not request medical
care, the hospital is entitled to restitution for services rendered." Of
course, these contract remedies are effectively moot if the arrestee is
indigent. Thus, some hospitals have asserted contract claims against

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id.

43.

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION

§

116 (1937).

748

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

local and state governments under the theory that the state or local law
enforcement's duty runs directly to the hospital; that is, by treating an
injured arrestee transported to the hospital by police prior to booking,
the hospital confers a benefit directly on the city or county for which it
is entitled to compensation.' Indeed, the hospital in City of Revere
asserted a similar argument at the trial court level.'
Still, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that the custodial entity,
not the inmate, is responsible for paying for medical treatment received,
noting that there "is no requirement in [Georgia] law that the inmate
pay for his own medical expenses. Moreover . .. it is the [custodial
agency's] responsibility to determine whether an inmate has health
insurance and to arrange for any payment from the health insurance
company." 4 6
C.

A Statutory Duty to Pay: Georgia'sApproach

While the Court in City of Revere established a constitutional right for
injured persons in police custody to receive medical care, some states,
including Georgia, had already codified this right.4 ' For example,
Georgia's statutory analog to City of Revere, enacted in 1956, provides,
in relevant part, that "it shall be the responsibility of the governmental
unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical custody of an inmate to
maintain the inmate, furnishing him ...
any needed medical and
hospital attention . . . ."4 The statute directly attaches a duty to
provide medical care to the issue of custody; thus, the agency having
custody of an injured inmate is responsible for ensuring he receives the
medical care to which he is constitutionally entitled.
In addition to codifying the constitutional right articulated in City of
Revere, the legislature also goes a step further by imposing a statutory
duty on government entities not only to furnish medical care to an
injured inmate in custody, but also to pay for that medical care."o The
statute establishes that:

44. See, e.g., Med Ctr. of Cent. Ga., 326 Ga. App. at 607, 757 S.E.2d at 211 (wherein the
hospital asserted quantum meruit and unjust enrichment theories of recovery against the
city for care rendered to patient-arrestees in custody of the city).
45. See Mass. Gen. Hosp., 434 N.E.2d at 187 (rejecting the hospital's contract theories
of recovery, including implied contract and quantum meruit).
46. Cherokee Cnty. v. N. Cobb Surgical Assocs., P.C., 221 Ga. App. 496,500,471 S.E.2d
561, 564 (1996).
47. See O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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[I]t shall be the responsibility of the [state] department [of corrections]
to bear the costs of any reasonable and necessary emergency medical
and hospital care which is provided to any inmate after the receipt by
the department of the notice provided by subsection (a) of Code Section
42-5-50 who is in the physical custody of any other political subdivision
or governmental agency of this state, except a county correctional
institution, if the inmate is available and eligible for the transfer of his
custody to the department [of corrections] . . .5

That is, where an inmate in custody of a state governmental entity other
than the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC) is imminently
eligible for transfer to the DOC (for example, following a conviction), the
DOC is responsible for that inmate's medical expenses. The DOC also
bears the cost of all follow-up medical care resulting from the initial
emergency care of the inmate.52 However, where state inmates are

housed in county jails, the DOC must bear only "the costs of direct
medical services required for emergency medical conditions posing an

immediate threat to life or limb if the inmate cannot be placed in a state
institution for the receipt of this care."" Otherwise, if the inmate is not
in custody of the DOC, "it shall remain the responsibility of the
governmental unit having the physical custody of an inmate to bear the
costs of such medical and hospital care."" The statute also enables the
DOC to promulgate rules and regulations regarding payment of inmate
medical expenses."
However, Georgia does not place sole financial responsibility for

inmate medical care on the DOC or custodial government entity. Rather,
subsection (b)(1) of the statute urges officers to "arrange for the inmate's
health insurance carrier to pay the health care provider for the services
or care rendered."" As such, the DOC or local government with custody

of the inmate only bears responsibility for those medical expenses not
covered by the inmate's health insurance." However, given that an
estimated ninety percent of inmates released from prison are uninsured
or otherwise lack the financial resources to pay for medical care,"
private health insurance does little to ease the government's duty to pay.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(b)(1); see also O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(b)(2).

§ 42-4-51

(2014).

58. Emily Wang, et al., Discharge Planningand Continuity of Health Care: Findings
from the San Francisco County Jail, 98 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 2182 (2008).
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Thus, a companion code section, O.C.G.A. § 42-4-51,59 clarifies that,
where an inmate is not eligible for health insurance benefits, the inmate
"shall be liable for the costs of such medical care provided to the inmate
and the assets and property of such inmate may be subject to levy and
execution under court order to satisfy such costs."60 Essentially, this
code provision creates a right of recovery on the part of the governmental unit with custody of the inmate against the inmate for medical
services paid for by the government.
Perhaps most saliently, however, the code section ends with the
following declaration: "Nothing in this Code section shall be construed
to relieve the ... agency having the physical custody of an inmate from
its responsibility to pay for any medical and hospital care rendered to
such inmate regardless of whether such individual has been convicted
of a crime."' Rather, the duty to pay for inmate medical care attaches
to the governmental entity with physical custody of the inmate,
regardless of the inmate's guilt or conviction status.62 In this respect,
the statute extends coverage for medical treatment under the statutory
duty to pay to pretrial detainees.
In 2009, the legislature codified its intention that local hospitals
preemptively contract with the DOC regarding rates and protocol for
providing inmate care. For those hospitals that are not parties to such
a contract with the DOC, the legislature has capped the rate of
compensation for providing inmate care at "the applicable Georgia
Medicaid rate for emergency services.""
D. The Scope of the State's Statutory Duty to Pay under O.C.G.A
§ 42-5-2(a)
In construing when a governmental unit has a duty to pay for inmate
medical care under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a), Georgia courts have generally
approached their analysis through two separate inquiries: (1) whether
the person receiving medical care is in physical custody of that
governmental unit at the time of treatment, and (2) whether the person
receiving medical care qualifies as an "inmate."
1. Custody Inquiry. Governmental units are only liable for an
individual's medical expenses incurred while that person is in the

59. O.C.G.A. § 42-4-51 (2014).
60. Id.
61. O.C.G.A. § 42-4-51(j).
62. Id.
63. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(c).
64. Id.
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physical custody of the governmental unit." Georgia courts have held
that whether an injured person transported to the hospital is in physical
custody of a governmental unit, subdivision, or agency is a question of
fact.' For example, in Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority v. Reece
(Reece I)," the hospital sued the County seeking reimbursement for
medical treatment provided to detainees of the sheriff's department.'
In upholding the lower court's denial of summary judgment, the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that whether the individuals were in custody of
the County when the medical expenses were incurred was a question of
fact, thus precluding summary judgment for either the County or the
sheriff."
Often, custody--or the absence of custody-is clear. For
example, when a person posts an appearance bond, the person is free to
leave at any time and is no longer in physical custody of a governmental
unit." Thus, after the posting of an appearance bond, the governmental
unit's responsibility to provide or pay for that person's medical care and
hospital attention under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 ceases 7 1
Other times, however, whether a person was in physical custody at the
time of treatment is far from clear. Indeed, some case law on this issue
arguably involves attempts by law enforcement officers to deny custody
precisely in order to avoid financial responsibility for a person's medical
treatment.7 2 Under the current state of the law, this conduct is
completely permissible. For instance, an officer may transport an injured
person in his custody to a hospital, but release the person from custody
just before intake to shirk financial responsibility for treatment
provided. The Georgia Court of Appeals alluded to, but did not investi-

65. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a); see Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-8, 1990 Ga. AG LEXIS 17 (Mar.
22, 1990) (opining that a municipality is only liable for a prisoner's medical expenses
incurred while the prisoner is in the physical custody of the municipality).
66. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Reece, 228 Ga. App. 532, 534,492 S.E.2d 292, 294
(1997).
67. 228 Ga. App. 532, 492 S.E.2d 292 (1997).
68. Id. at 532, 492 S.E.2d at 293.
69. Id. at 534, 535, 492 S.E.2d at 294.
70. Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-8, supra note 65.
71. See id. (noting that, when custody of a prisoner ceases by virtue of the prisoner's
posting an appearance bond, the municipality's responsibility for needed medical care and
hospital attention also ceases; at that point, the municipality no longer has physical
custody of the individual since the individual is free to leave at any time the individual
desires).
72. See Macon-Bibb Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Reece, 236 Ga. App. 669, 671-72, 672 & n.2,
513 S.E.2d 243, 246 & n.2 (1999) (wherein the arrestees were handcuffed during transport
to the hospital, but deputies removed the cuffs upon arrival at the hospital. The court
found that whether this procedure was a "subterfuge designed to avoid the [statutory]
financial responsibility ... is for the trier of fact").
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gate, one such likely occurrence in Macon-Bibb County Hospital
Authority v. Reece (Reece II).73
In Reece II, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the mere presence
of handcuffs on the patient at the time of intake is not determinative of
custody; rather, a jury may lawfully find that a person transported to
the hospital in handcuffs who is uncuffed upon entering the hospital is
not in custody for the purposes of establishing a duty to pay for medical
treatment. In that case, the sheriff's deputies apprehended three men
in a vehicle apparently fleeing the scene of a reported burglary in
progress and gunfire in the area. All three men were injured and
bleeding from apparent gunshot wounds. The deputies confiscated guns
from the injured suspects' persons and from their vehicle. The officers
then handcuffed all three men, who then waited on the highway median
for an ambulance. The men remained in handcuffs during the ambulance
ride to the hospital. Upon arrival in the hospital lobby, the sheriff's
deputy removed the handcuffs from the men. The deputy also filled out

forms entitled "LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY APPROVAL FOR
INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PRISONERS" and indicated on
those forms that the persons were in custody of the county sheriff's
office.7 ' However, the deputy also verbally explained to the intake
secretary that
"These subjects are not prisoners." . . . "They're not Jones County
prisoners." . . . On the form [Deputy Mosteller noted:] that the patient
will be responsible for the bill and, at the bottom, send the bill to the
patient because [Deputy Mosteller knew ofJ no reason to send it to [the
Jones County Sheriff's Office].76
The hospital later sued the County to recover for the patients' treatment."
The trial court found that the patients were not in custody of the
sheriff's department at the time of treatment, and the sheriff's office was
thus relieved of responsibility for the medical bills. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that "the fact that the
three men had been handcuffed for transportation to the hospital is not
determinative of their subsequent status, when the handcuffs were
79

removed."

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

236 Ga. App. 669, 513 S.E.2d 243 (1999).
Id. at 671-72, 513 S.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 669, 669-70, 670, 513 S.E.2d at 244, 245.
Id. at 670, 513 S.E.2d at 245 (alterations in original).
Id. at 669, 513 S.E.2d at 244.
Id. at 670, 513 S.E.2d at 245.
Id. at 671-72, 513 S.E.2d at 246.
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However, despite upholding the trial court's finding that the patients
were not in custody, the appellate court acknowledged the potential
motivations a police officer may have in removing handcuffs just before
entering a hospital, noting "[a]ny question whether this procedure was
a subterfuge designed to avoid the financial responsibility imposed by
O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) also is for the trier of fact.""o By leaving the
evaluation of an officer's motivations for removing handcuffs and
denying custody to a jury of county taxpayers, however, the court
enables governmental entities to continue unsavory practices designed
to avoid their statutory duty.
2. "Inmate"Inquiry. Because custody is decidedly a factual inquiry,
however, the legislature and courts can do little to regulate denial of
custody as a means of avoiding the statutory duty to pay. Despite the
custody-denial loophole, the crux of much litigation in Georgia concerns
just one word in the statute: "inmate." The term is not defined within
the chapter or article that imposes an express duty on law enforcement
officers to provide and pay for inmate care." However, the code twice
defines "inmate" elsewhere in the title as "a person who is detained in
a detention facility by reason of being charged with or convicted of a
felony, a misdemeanor, or a municipal offense."82 Whether an arrestee
who has been transported to the hospital prior to a formal booking in the
jail qualifies as an inmate under the statute-and, if so, which
governmental entity is financially responsible for care provided-has
sparked much litigation in Georgia. However, state appellate courts have
failed to issue binding precedent on the issue, leaving cities that do not
operate their own jails a statutory technicality to evade a duty to pay for
arrestee medical care.
The Georgia Court of Appeals has definitively held that "inmate"
under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 includes charged pretrial detainees." In
Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority v. Houston County,84 the court

addressed a conflict typical of litigation surrounding O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2:
a hospital sued a county to recover costs of medical care provided to a
pretrial detainee who attempted suicide while in custody.85 The court
held that "inmate" under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 means not only a person who

80. Id. at 672 n.2, 513 S.E.2d at 246 n.2.
81. See O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2.
82. See O.C.G.A. § 42-4-30(2); O.C.G.A. § 42-4-50(3) (2014).
83. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Houston Cnty., 207 Ga. App. 530, 532,428 S.E.2d
374, 375 (1993).
84. 207 Ga. App. 530, 428 S.E.2d 374 (1993).
85. Id. at 530, 428 S.E.2d at 375.
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has been convicted of an offense, but also a person who has been
detained by reason of being charged with a crime." Thus, a county or
municipality is responsible for medical expenses of an individual it
arrests and charges with a crime, regardless of the person's procedural
status.8 7 The court also clarified that the self-inflicted nature of a
detainee's injuries do not affect the county's liability for hospital care
rendered, and that O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 expressly waives counties'
sovereign immunity surrounding financial responsibility for inmate
medical care."
The Georgia Court of Appeals further extended financial protection for
hospitals under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 by requiring a county to pay for the
medical care necessary after arrest but prior to formal booking." In
Cherokee County v. North Cobb Surgical Associates, P C.," county
deputies shot a person they were attempting to arrest and subsequently
transported him to the hospital." The court held that the County was
responsible for the suspect's medical care as an "inmate," even though
he was not literally "detained in the [county] detention facility" prior to
his medical treatment.92 That is, but for the seriousness of the arrestee's injuries, the arrestee would have been placed in the County's
detention facility for booking and would have been taken before a
judicial officer."
However, the court's holding in Cherokee County left governmental
entities room to argue that their statutory duty to pay applied only to
factual scenarios involving an arrestee injured during the course of an
arrest or, more specifically, injured by a law enforcement officer. Indeed,
in her concurrence in Cherokee County, Judge Beasley explained that
any doubt about the county's liability for medical care, "vanishe[d] in the
light of the constitutional prohibition against 'any person being abused
in being arrested, while under arrest, or in prison.'"94 Judge Beasley

86. Id. at 532, 428 S.E.2d at 375.
87. Id. at 531, 428 S.E.2d at 375.
88. Id. at 532, 428 S.E.2d at 375.
89. Cherokee Cnty. v. N. Cobb Surgical Assocs., P.C., 221 Ga. App. 496, 499,471 S.E.2d
561, 564 (1996).
90. 221 Ga. App. 496, 471 S.E.2d 561 (1996).
91. Id. at 497, 471 S.E.2d at 562.
92. Id. at 499-500, 471 S.E.2d at 564.
93. Id. at 499, 471 S.E.2d at 564.
94. Id. at 500, 471 S.E.2d at 564 (Beasley, J., concurring) (quoting GA. CONST. art. I,
§ 1, para. VII (1983)) (arguing that where the county had taken custody of the plaintiff
"not only to transport him to the hospital for emergency medical aid but also to charge him
with aggravated assault.. . . [i]t could hardly be argued that it would not be an abuse to
fail or refuse to obtain medical aid for McFarland after he was shot").
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noted that the Georgia statutes discussed in the majority opinion-namely O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2-"are an affirmative implementation of
this constitutional prohibition."15
The following year in Reece I, the court of appeals clarified that a
county may not deny its statutory duty to provide and pay for medical
care of someone in custody on the basis that the person sustained the
injuries prior to being taken into custody." According to the court, such
a statutory construction of O.C.G.A. § 42-5--2 would violate the abuse
clause in Georgia's constitution.
Indeed, the court cited Judge
Beasley's concurrence in Cherokee County, reasoning,
[i]f, as the county suggests, it had no responsibility for medical
conditions which did not arise while an inmate was in custody, the
sheriff's department would never have to furnish medical treatment to
anyone who entered its custody with a pre-existing condition, disease,
or impairment. This is neither the plain meaning nor the intent of
O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2, and would likely result in a constitutional violation
of the right to be free from abuse during arrest, while under arrest, or
in prison."
Thus, regardless of when or how the arrestee's injury or sickness
arose, it is the statutory responsibility of the arresting agency to provide
and pay for his medical care.
Based on the above Georgia appellate court cases interpreting the
statutory definition of "inmate," there is an apparent trend toward
broadly interpreting the term to include nearly all individuals in law
enforcement custody, thus favoring hospitals and expanding the state's
statutory duty to pay. However, in two recent 2014 opinions issued by
the Georgia Court of Appeals, the court declined to issue binding
precedent regarding two areas of statutory uncertainty about who pays
for inmate medical treatment: (1) whether the waiver of sovereign
immunity under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 applies to municipalities and (2)
whether a municipality that does not operate its own jail is responsible
for the medical treatment of arrestees the city transports to the hospital
prior to formal booking in the jail.

95. Id.
96. 228 Ga. App. at 536, 492 S.E.2d at 295.
97. Id. at 536, 492 S.E.2d at 295-96; see GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XVII. The Georgia
constitution prohibits abusing a person who has been arrested or is in prison. GA. CONST.
art. I, § 1, para. XVII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; nor shall any person be abused in being
arrested, while under arrest, or in prison.").
98. Reece I, 228 Ga. App. at 536, 492 S.E.2d at 295-96.
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First, in City of Hapeville v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp.," the
court held that the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for medical
providers asserting claims for reimbursement against county or state
jailers applies to municipal jailers.'o In that case, Grady Hospital
brought an action against the City of Hapeville and its police department seeking reimbursement for $81,694.74 for medical treatment
provided to four prisoners in the City's custody. The City claimed that,
under sovereign immunity, it was immune from the hospital's suit.101
The trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, citing
the finding by the court of appeals in Cherokee County that O.C.G.A.
§ 42-5-2 imposes a financial duty not only on the state and counties, but
also municipalities who have custody of inmates, thus waiving sovereign
immunity for municipalities.1 02 The City appealed.'
While the Georgia legislature generally distinguishes municipal jailers
from county jailers,'' the court of appeals determined that, because
O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(b) governs all inmates to whom O.C.G.A. Chapter
410' applies, O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(b) necessarily includes inmates in
custody of municipalities.' Thus, the court held that the waiver of
sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(b) allows hospitals to seek
reimbursement for treating not only county and state inmates, but also
municipal inmates. 07
This opinion could have closed a statutory gap, clarified a previously
uncertain area of law, and provided meaningful guidance for financial
planning purposes on behalf of hospitals and law enforcement agencies
alike. However, because Judge Dillard filed a separate opinion concurring in judgment only, the opinion only decided the issues sub judice and
does not constitute binding precedent. 0 8 Of course, despite Judge
Dillard's concurrence, the opinion may still be persuasive authority for
hospitals facing municipalities who refuse to compensate the hospital for
care provided to city inmates. But because the law remains unclear, it
continues to invite litigation for already financially-strained hospitals.

99. 328 Ga. App. 332, 761 S.E.2d 871 (2014).
100. Id. at 336-37, 761 S.E.2d at 874.
101. Id. at 332-33, 333, 761 S.E.2d at 871-72.
102. Id. at 333, 761 S.E.2d at 872; see Cherokee Cnty., 221 Ga. App. at 499, 471 S.E.2d
at 564 (addressing whether an inmate was in custody such that the County was liable for
his medical expenses under O.C.G.A. § 45-5-2).
103. City of Hapeville, 328 Ga. App. at 333, 761 S.E.2d at 872.
104. Id. at 336, 761 S.E.2d at 874.
105. O.C.G.A. §§ 42-4-1 to -105 (2014).
106. City of Hapeville, 328 Ga. App. at 336, 761 S.E.2d at 874.
107. Id. at 336-37, 761 S.E.2d at 874.
108. Id. at 337, 761 S.E.2d at 874-75 (Dillard, J., concurring in judgment).
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Second, in Medical Center of Central Georgia v. City of Macon,'o the
same court addressed but declined to substantively rule on a separate
issue related to the healthcare expenses of municipal inmates. The case
concerns whether a city that does not operate its own jail has a statutory
duty under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 to pay for medical care rendered to
arrestees and detainees in its custody.' In fact, Medical Center of
CentralGeorgia and the nine years of protracted litigation leading up to
the opinion provide a rich case study of the practical battles between
hospitals and cities over who has a statutory duty to pay for inmate
medical care.
From 2002 to 2006, the City of Macon Police Department (MPD)
allegedly transported 220 people to the hospital for treatment prior to a
formal booking in the county jail, which was operated by the Bibb
County Sheriff.... The City of Macon and its police department did not
operate a jail at the time, though it did have contracts with Bibb County
and neighboring Monroe County to house inmates." 2 Once the inmate
was formally booked and incarcerated in the county jail, the Bibb County
Sheriff bore sole financial responsibility for the inmate's medical
expenses, regardless of which agency--county or city-arrested him and
transported him to the jail. According to the sheriff's policy at the time,
every person transported to the county jail for incarceration was to be
medically cleared prior to formal booking and detention at the jail. That
is, the city or county arresting agency was required to transport the sick
or injured arrestee to receive medical treatment before taking him to the
3
jail.11
In 2005, the hospital filed its first complaint against the City,
asserting that the City was required to pay the hospital for its treatment
of inmates brought to the hospital in police custody. The hospital argued
that the City had breached its statutory duty to pay for inmate medical
treatment under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2. The hospital later amended its
complaint to add contract theories of recovery, including quantum meruit
and unjust enrichment. Ultimately, the hospital alleged that the City

109. 326 Ga. App. 603, 757 S.E.2d 207 (2014).
110. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., 326 Ga. App. at 603, 757 S.E.2d at 207.
111. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at *4-5.
112. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., 326 Ga. App. at 604, 757 S.E.2d at 208. Because the City
of Macon and Bibb County governments have since consolidated, the City of Macon Police
Department no longer exists. See Jim Gaines, Macon-Bibb Merger: First Year in Review,
MACON TELEGRAPH (Jan. 3, 2015, 9:08 PM), http://www.macon.com/news/local/politicsgovernment/article30l63788.html. The city police department was instead absorbed into
what is now the Macon-Bibb County Sheriffs Office, which operates as an arm of the state
and maintains its own jail. Id.
113. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at *4.
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owed $962,441.99 for the hospital's treatment of 220 inmates in custody
of the city police. According to the hospital, most of the 220 patients
were admitted to its emergency room and included persons injured by
another perpetrator at the crime scene, injured while fleeing and
attempting to elude arrest by the police, or otherwise injured by the
police while being taken into custody. Other admitted patients suffered
from preexisting injuries, illnesses, or substance abuse issues requiring
medical clearance prior to incarceration. While the City conceded
financial responsibility for medical expenses incurred as a result of
custody-related injuries (at least where other payment sources, such as
insurance, were unavailable), it denied financial liability for treatment
of all other injuries and conditions."
In 2009, four years after filing its initial complaint, the City moved for
summary judgment in its favor under four legal theories:
(1) it owed no duty under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) because the patients
at issue were not "inmates" of the City within the meaning of the
statute; (2) O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) did not create a right for the Hospital
to sue the City for payment for the care of inmates; (3) the Hospital's
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims failed for a variety of
reasons, and (4) the Hospital neglected to provide a timely and
sufficient ante litem notice for numerous patient accounts listed in its
complaint, as amended."'
In 2012, three years after the City moved for summary judgment, the
trial court held a hearing to rule on the City's motion. Indeed, after the
City filed its motion in 2009, the parties agreed to "let it sit," voluntarily
suspending briefing to allow discovery to continue. During that period,
the parties took at least 289 depositions.
At the hearing, counsel for the City conceded, for purposes of the
motion for summary judgment only, that each of the 220 patients was
in physical custody of the City police at the time of treatment. However,
the City asserted that, should the case proceed to trial, it would contest
the custody of each of the 220 patients treated in the hospital's
emergency room for which the hospital sought reimbursement. 1 1 6
Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the
City's motion for summary judgment on the basis that O.C.G.A.
§ 42-5-2(a) "imposed no duty owed by the City to the Hospital."117 The
trial court also noted in the alternative that, even if the statute imposed

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at *, *3-4, *5, *5-6.
Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc., 326 Ga. App. at 604, 757 S.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 604, 605, 606, 757 S.E.2d at 208, 209.
Id. at 604-05, 757 S.E.2d at 208.
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such a duty, the hospital failed to meet its burden of proof."' Specifically, the trial court found that the legislature had intended "at a
minimum, that a person (1) be either charged or convicted of a crime,
and (2) be held at a jail or other similar, traditional detention facility.""' Because the court found that the City produced no evidence as
to either of these enumerated elements, the court granted the City's
motion for summary judgment.' 20 This ruling by the trial court is
especially surprising, given that both the City and hospital agreed and
clearly articulated that the issue of physical custody was one of fact.
Indeed, after the hospital timely appealed the trial court's ruling, both
parties formally stipulated that the physical custody of the patients was
not a ground for the granting of the City's motion for summary
judgment, and the hospital was thus not required to supplement the
record on appeal with evidence of the physical custody of the 220
patients. Despite this stipulation and after the appeal was docketed, the
hospital filed a motion to supplement the record with 289 deposition
exhibits and five sets of discovery responses. The trial court denied the
motion, stating that it was too late to add evidence to the record that the
hospital had declined to produce during the three years while the City's
motion for summary judgment was pending, or the three months
between the hearing on the motion and the court's order. To allow the
hospital to supplement the record would, according to the trial court, ask
the court of appeals to exercise original jurisdiction in the case.121
The hospital argued on appeal that the trial court erred by concluding
that the 220 patients were not "inmates" under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a)
and that the statute created no duty for the City to pay for the
treatment of those patients in physical custody of the City. Notably,
however, the hospital did not attack the trial court's alternative grounds
for granting summary judgment: the hospital's failure to present
evidence that the patients had been charged with or convicted of a crime
to qualify them as inmates under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a). While the code
section does not define "inmate," the trial court deduced from other code
sections that "inmates" included only those individuals who had been
charged with or convicted of a crime.1 22 Despite the trial court's
conclusion-apparently erroneous, at least in light of previous holdings
by the court of appeals in Reece I and Cherokee County-the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 605, 757 S.E.2d at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 605-06, 606, 757 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 606-07, 607 & n.6, 757 S.E.2d at 209 & n.6.
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City, noting "[g]rounds that are not attacked as erroneous will not be
considered on appeal and are presumed to be binding and correct ....
An appellant's failure to attack alternative bases for summary judgment
results in the affirmance of that judgment."'2 3 That is, the court
declined to rule on the substantive question at issue based on the
12 4
hospital's failure to adequately preserve the issue on appeal. Indeed,
the court explained in a footnote:
We do not address the trial court's conclusion that O.C.G.A. § 42-52(a) does not create a duty for the City to pay the Hospital for the
medical treatment of those in its physical custody. By its terms,
O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) applies only to "inmates" in the physical custody
of a governmental entity, and as explained above, the Hospital has not
enumerated as error the trial court's finding that it failed to meet its
burden of presenting evidence showing that the patients at issue
2
qualify as "inmates" under this Code section.' 1
Additionally, because the trial court did not address the hospital's
alternate theories of recovery, the court of appeals declined to address
the hospital's quasi contract claims of quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment. 26 Instead, the court vacated only the portion of the trial
court's order granting summary judgment on the basis of the quasi
contract claims, and remanded the case to the trial court to address
those claims.1 27
Alas, after ten years of litigation, the question of whether a municipality that does not operate its own detention center has a statutory duty
to pay for the medical care of arrestees transported to the hospital in its
custody remains unsettled. Meanwhile, the Medical Center of Central
Georgia likely incurred untold fees in addition to the nearly one million
dollars in unrecovered patient treatment expenses that sparked the
28
lawsuit. The City of Macon has since consolidated with Bibb County,1
thus dissolving the City police department into the County sheriff's office
and making the question of a statutory duty to pay a non-issue for the
City and the hospital going forward. However, for Georgia's municipalities that do not operate their own jails, a statutory gap remains that
allows them to avoid their statutory responsibility to pay for the medical
treatment of arrestees transported to the hospital in their custody.

123. Id. at 607, 757 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting Tidwell v. Coweta Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 240
Ga. App. 55, 55-56, 521 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1999)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 607 n.7, 757 S.E.2d at 210 n.7.
126. Id. at 607, 757 S.E.2d at 210.
127. Id. at 608, 757 S.E.2d at 210.
128. Gaines, supra note 112.
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Hospitals that receive arrestee patients in custody of those cities have
no definite avenue of recovery other than likely costly, protracted
litigation with no legal precedent assuring success.
E.

The EMTALA-phant in the Room

Given that Georgia hospitals already receive statutory assurance of
payment for treating most classes of inmates and arrestees that police
transport to their emergency rooms, a small statutory gap in indigent
coverage would seem a relatively small burden to bear. However, the
United States Supreme Court's holding in City of Revere-that the
government need only pay for inmate medical care if that care could not
otherwise be obtained without its payment-was decided before Congress
enacted EMTALA, the federal, unfunded mandate requiring all hospitals
receiving Medicare funding to evaluate and treat injured and sick
patients presented to their emergency rooms.1 2 9
The United States Congress passed EMTALA in 1986 as part of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).' 30
EMTALA requires hospital emergency rooms and departments that
accept payments from Medicare to provide a medical screening examination to patients seeking treatment for a medical condition, regardless of
a patient's citizenship, legal status, or ability to pay.' Also known as
the anti-dumping law, EMTALA aims to prevent hospitals from dumping
patients on other hospitals-that is, transferring critically ill patients,
without medical justification, to other hospitals based on the patient's
ability to pay or insured status. 3 2 Patient dumping allowed hospitals
to avoid paying the costs of very expensive care for which they would
receive no payment.'"' While the legislative intent behind EMTALA is
sound and serves the public interest, the law contains no reimbursement
provisions, deeming it an unfunded mandate.3 EMTALA virtually
eliminated any possibility that an arrestee or inmate would be denied
medical care based on the likelihood of receiving payment for their
services. Thus, under the City of Revere standard and absent a statutory
duty to pay, EMTALA and City of Revere work together to allow city and
county law enforcement to compel treatment of injured persons in their

129. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
130. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161 to -1169 (2012).
131. FactSheets:EMTALA, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/NewsMedia-top-banner/EMTALA/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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custody while avoiding any financial responsibility for that treatment
with a quick detour to the hospital before booking.
Indeed, prior to the enactment of EMTALA, no hospital had a common
law obligation to admit a person for treatment."' The common law
rule derives from an absence of a duty to rescue.'"' Thus, prior to
EMTALA, where the common law rule applied, a hospital could lawfully
refuse treatment to an indigent person in police custody unless a state
statute prohibited hospitals from turning away patients.' 3 ' Under the
common law, the constitutional duty articulated in City of Revere to
provide medical treatment would effectively force the state to pay for
care in order to assure that the prisoner receives it. However, when the
Court decided City of Revere, many states had enacted their own
EMTALA equivalents requiring their hospitals to treat patients
regardless of ability to pay. Still, the Court likely did not contemplate a
federal mandate as broad-sweeping as EMTALA.
On the other hand, despite hospitals' enormous public responsibilities
that are disproportionate to their funding, state and local governments
nationwide already pay almost the entirety of incarcerated individuals'
health care costs."' Further, incarcerated and arrested persons often
exhibit some of the most complex and costly health care needs."' What
is more, an estimated seventy to ninety percent of the approximately ten
million individuals released from jail or prison each year are uninsured.' 40 The high rate of uninsured individuals among those who
wind up in the criminal justice system is further compounded by high
rates of mental illness, substance use disorders, infectious disease, and
chronic health conditions that are as much as seven times higher than
rates in the general population.'"' The state legislature may hesitate,
then, to pile on more financial responsibility for medical care for a class
of people who have some of the most complex mental and physical health
issues among the population.

135. William Contente, City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital: Government
Responsibility for an Arrestee's Medical Care, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 359, 371 (1983).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Medicaid and FinancingHealth Care for Individuals Involved with the Criminal
Justice System, JUST. CTR.: THE COUNCIL FOR ST. GOVERNMENTS, (Dec. 2013), availableat
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ACA-Medicaid-Expansion-PolicyBrief.pdf.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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IMPLICATIONS AND MOVING FORWARD

There is no obviously apparent, perfect solution for deciding who pays
for arrestee and municipal inmate medical care in Georgia. However, a
better alternative to Georgia's current approach is certainly plausible.
While Florida and Georgia share a border and make up two thirds of the
Eleventh Circuit, the states take drastically different approaches in
allocating financial responsibility for arrestee medical care. Whereas the
Georgia legislature has only directly addressed "inmate" medical
care-an arguably ambiguous term that, depending on court interpretation, may or may not include arrestees and may or may not implicate
municipalities without a jail-Florida has enacted- a clear, hierarchical
statutory scheme that specifically allocates financial responsibility for
medical treatment of injured or ill arrestees.
A.

Florida'sApproach: A ComparativeAnalysis
In 1983, Florida enacted legislation regarding financial responsibility
for medical expenses incurred for providing medical care, treatment,
hospitalization, and transportation of arrested persons.1 42 Section 1 of
Chapter 83-189 includes Florida Statute section 901.35, '14 aptly titled
"Financial Responsibility for Medical Expenses."'" The statute begins
by placing financial responsibility for medical expenses incurred after
being taken into custody but prior to a formal booking on the arrestee
himself, providing that paying "expenses of medical care, treatment,
hospitalization, and transportation for any person ill, wounded, or
otherwise injured during or at the time of arrest for any violation of a
state law or a county or municipal ordinance is the responsibility of the
person receiving such care, treatment, hospitalization, and transportation."'45 Thus, if the arrested person receiving care has financial means
to reimburse the hospital for his treatment, payment is his responsibility
alone. Under these conditions, the statute provides a hierarchy of
sources from which hospitals may seek reimbursement for services
rendered.146 These sources include, in order: (1) the arrestee's health
insurance company, if the arrestee who received the care is insured; (2)
the arrestee personally; or (3) a financial settlement for medical care
payable or accruing to the injured arrestee.m' Because a majority of
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

FLA. STAT. § 901.35 (West 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 901.35(1).
Id. § 901.35(1)(a)-(c).
Id.
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injured and ill arrestees are uninsured, indigent, and not entitled to
settlement, however, this portion of the statute provides little relief for
a healthcare provider. In recognition of this reality, the statute provides
that, where funding is unavailable from the aforementioned sources, the
costs of medical care, treatment, hospitalization, and transportation
"shall be paid: (a) From the general fund of the county in which the
person was arrested, if the arrest was for violation of a state law or
county ordinance; or (b) From the municipal general fund, if the arrest
was for violation of a municipal ordinance."148
In other words, the legislature attaches the duty to pay to the offense
giving rise to the arrest. If city police arrest a person for violating a
municipal ordinance, the city is responsible for paying for the arrestee's
medical expenses. Likewise, if county sheriff's deputies (who are
technically state officers) arrest a person for violating a state or county
ordinance, the county government bears financial responsibility for those
medical expenses.
While the responsibility for payment of such medical costs exists until
the arrested person is released from the custody of the arresting agency,
the inquiry about who pays does not turn solely on custody. For example,
if a city police officer apprehended a suspect for violating a state law or
county ordinance and transported her to the hospital, the county would
be responsible for her medical care.14 9
Additionally, Florida's Attorney General has opined that the statute's
hierarchical system allocating financial responsibility applies "for any
medical expenses incurred for the treatment of persons ill or injured at
the time of arrest, regardless of whether the person's condition arises
from or is attributable to the circumstances of the arrest."' Thus, the
nature or source of the injuries at the time of arrest is irrelevant to the
applicability of the statutory scheme.
Of course, Florida's statutory approach has not been immune from
litigation and appellate court challenges. As in Georgia, much of the
relevant litigation in Florida involves hospitals suing cities and counties
for reimbursement for medical care rendered to indigent arrestees.
Indeed, in a familiar sequence of events in City of Fort Myers v. Hospital
Board of Directors of Lee County,"' the hospital sued the City and
county sheriff seeking payment for medical services rendered to twentytwo arrestee patients transported to the hospital in City or County
custody. The trial court found in favor of the hospital, and the City and

148.

Id. § 901.35(2)(a)-(b).

149.
150.
151.

See Ft. Myers v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs., 505 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-6, 1985 Fla. AG LEXIS 99, at *8 (Feb. 4, 1985).
505 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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County appealed.1 5 2 On appeal, the court held that, because the
patients were arrested for and charged with violations of state law, the
county sheriff was financially responsible for their medical care.'
Interestingly, the facts of the case were quite similar to those in
Medical Center of Central Georgia v. City of Macon."' Like the City in
Medical Center of Central Georgia, the City of Fort Myers Police
Department does not operate a jail. Thus, Fort Myers city police, like
Macon police, transported all of their arrestees to the county jail for
formal bookings. Unlike the Georgia Court of Appeals, however, the
court in City of Fort Myers held that a mere detour to the hospital prior
to an arrestee's formal booking in the jail did not shift the financial
burden for that medical care to the treating hospital. Rather, in Florida,
the duty to pay attaches to the governmental entity seeking to charge
and prosecute the individual. Given the outcome of City of Fort Myers,
the obvious question arises about why Bibb County, Georgia, was never
a party to the lawsuit in Medical Center of Central Georgia.
Notably, Florida Statute § 901.35 is not funded by the state legislature. However, the clear statutory allocation of financial responsibility
for arrestee medical care to local governments based on the agency
attempting to charge the suspect provides at least some predictability to
an unpredictable expense. That is, because municipal and county
governments have a clear statutory duty that has been upheld by
Florida's courts, those entities can at least attempt to budget and plan
for those expenses.
B.

Closing Georgia's Statutory Gaps

The current custody-based and inmate-based inquiries under Georgia's
statutory scheme breed uncertainty among hospitals and local governments. At the same time, the current regime is ambiguous and malleable
enough to allow interested parties to game the system to their advantage. For example, the current statutory scheme enables law enforcement agencies to deny responsibility for payment of arrestee and inmate
care in any number of ways that seem contrary to legislative intent,
including denying that the patient is in custody, arguing that arrestees
are not "inmates," or asserting that the statutory duty to pay does not
waive sovereign immunity for municipalities. In turn, while the law
affords hospitals little leverage to demand payment and no room to deny
treatment, it incentivizes hospitals to provide the absolute minimum
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amount of treatment to those indigent inmates and arrestees transported
to the hospital by law enforcement.
For example, imagine that a hypothetical Georgia city police officer
injures a person while apprehending him and placing him under arrest.
Because of the arrestee's injuries, the officer transports the arrestee to
the local hospital for treatment prior to a formal booking in the jail.
Because, under Georgia law, a governmental entity is financially
responsible for those persons in its physical custody, the officer removes
the arrestee's handcuffs before entering the emergency room. He tells the
intake nurse that the patient is not in his custody or under arrest in an
obvious attempt to avoid financial responsibility for his medical
expenses. However, knowing that the arrestee is a flight risk and has
just committed a violent crime, the officer is wary of letting the suspect
go free. Thus, the officer waits for the indigent patient to receive
treatment and plans on taking him back into custody once he is released
by the doctor.
Imagine, further, that the hospital has become privy to the law
enforcement agency's tactic for denying payment and, out of spite, begins
a practice of discharging patients out the back door, unbeknownst to the
officer. Because the hospital knows it will not likely receive reimbursement for the patient's care, it provides as little treatment as possible to
minimize costs while upholding the baseline evaluation and stabilization
requirements under EMTALA. The suspect-patient, perhaps suffering
from complex health issues, is released onto the streets where he may
either commit another crime or further exacerbate his medical condition.
Under the current state of the law, this entire exchange is legal-and
implicitly court sanctioned.
The occurrence and nature of indigent arrestees' preexisting illnesses,
injuries sustained during the commission of a crime, and ailments
incurred while being taken into custody are inherently difficult to
predict. The costs of medical care necessary to treat those injuries is,
likewise, inherently unpredictable. Planning for that kind of expense is
difficult. However, Georgia's statutory gaps create an additional layer of
uncertainty. By not explicitly delineating what entity is financially
responsible for medical treatment provided to municipal inmates and
arrestees through a clear and inclusive definition of "inmate," Georgia's
courts and legislature have made planning for such expenses a near
impossibility for all parties involved-the cities, the counties, and the
hospitals.
Indeed, just one critically wounded or chronically ill arrestee could
quickly drain local government funds. It is no surprise, then, that cities
fiercely litigate statutory ambiguities about what entity is financially
responsible for such care. While protracted litigation presents a
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significant expense, the unpredictable expense of such medical treatment
justifies, in the minds of local government officials, the cost of litigating
the issue.
However, with notice that responsibility for such medical care is
expected, local governments may practicably plan for such expenses
accordingly, for example, through beefing up their insurance coverage.
On the other hand, unreimbursed, compulsory care provided to more
than a few injured arrestees could feasibly push an already struggling
rural Georgia hospital into bankruptcy. Such an event could foreclose
access to medical care for Georgians in these areas. It is doubtful that
the Georgia legislature intended to ensure the provision of medical care
to incarcerated persons at the expense of foreclosing non-incarcerated
Georgians' access to medical care. Moreover, upon the closure of these
hospitals, even incarcerated persons' access to medical care is jeopardized and made more expensive by longer commutes to the closest
regional hospitals for treatment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The uncertainty bred by the current statutory gaps and absence of
binding precedent interpreting these ambiguities harms all parties
involved: hospitals, local governments, incarcerated persons, and
citizens. Ultimately, this Comment implores the state legislature to
create more laws in this area; or, more specifically, create clearer law.
It is time for Georgia to pick a payor: to decide who should pay for
arrestee and municipal inmate medical care and eliminate unlimited,
unpredictable discretion among self-interested parties.
L. TAYLOR HAMRICK

